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STUDENT EXPRESSION: THE LEGACY OF TINKER IN THE
WAKE OF COLUMBINE
EDWARD T. RAMEY
The proposition that the First Amendment protects expression by
students is neither a deeply rooted nor easily applied principle. At best,
the proposition finds its tentative roots in Supreme Court opinions back
as far as the 1940s,' and perhaps earlier, though it was not until 1969 that
the principle found its seminal, eloquent expression in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.2 In many respects,
Tinker represents a predictable judicial response to the inevitable ex-
cesses of public school administrators accorded too much unquestioned
deference in matters touching upon individual liberties. Two high school
and one junior high student peaceably wore black armbands to school in
December 1965 as a "silent, passive"3 expression of protest against the
growing hostilities-or "conflagration"4 as Justice Fortas colorfully put
it-in Vietnam. In so doing, the students violated a school district regu-
lation adopted and directed pointedly and specifically at them.5 On the
evidence before the Court, the incident "was entirely divorced from actu-
1. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Court in Barnette,
over a vigorous dissent by Justice Frankfurter, struck down a school board mandate compelling
students (who were Jehovah's Witnesses) to salute the American flag in contravention of their and
their families' religious beliefs. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. Lest this admittedly heroic judicial
stand at a time of popular patriotic fervor be deemed a far reaching and ringing endorsement of
student fights of affirmative expression, the issue in controversy involved compulsion of a pledge of
fealty (which the Court found to "invade[ ] the sphere of intellect and spirit"), overtones of
encroachment upon the free exercise of religion, and coercion of "both parent and child." Id. at 642,
631. Additionally, the Court ruled to the contrary on precisely the same issue, over the single dissent
of Justice Stone, a mere three years earlier. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600
(1940).
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court in Tinker cites Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), as authority for the proposition that neither "students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. However, neither case stands for such a proposition. The Meyer opinion
was grounded in substantive due process considerations-in the soon to be vilified tradition of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. The Meyer Court struck
down a law prohibiting the teaching of modem foreign languages as violative of the right of a
teacher to engage in his profession of teaching and "of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children." Id. at 400. The facts and reasoning in Bartels are to the same effect. See Bartels, 262
U.S. at 409. Similarly, Pierce v. Society of Sisters also cited by Tinker, striking down a requirement
that all children attend public schools, invokes Meyer in recognition of a purely substantive due
process "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). These opinions have little,
if anything, to do with the rights of students themselves to engage in free expression.
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
4. Id. at 510.
5. See id. at 504.
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ally or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it."6 The
Court found there was no indication of "interference, actual or nascent,
with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students to
be secure and to be let alone; 7 there was "no indication that the work of
the schools or any class was disrupted;"8 there were "no threats or acts of
violence on school premises."9 The only "suggestions of fear of disorder"
arose from the fact some friends of a former student killed in Vietnam
were still in school and that students at another high school threatened to
wear armbands of other colors.' ° The district's own official memorandum
on the incident indicated that its regulation had been motivated by a be-
lief that schools simply were not appropriate places for
"demonstrations."'" Finally, the evidence showed that the schools were
engaging rampantly in viewpoint discrimination-permitting other stu-
dents to sport political campaign buttons and Iron Crosses ("traditionally
a symbol of Nazism"), 2 without objection. On these facts, the three stu-
dents were summarily suspended and refused readmission until they
would return without their armbands. 3
One does not have to impugn the "good faith"'4 of the Des Moines
school administrators to conclude, as did seven of the nine justices, that
their actions exceeded the bounds within which deference to their ad-
ministrative judgment remained appropriate. 5 Even a more conservative
6. Id. at 505.
7. Id. at 508. In dissent, Justice Black noted, however, that "the armbands did exactly what
the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the students' minds off
their class work and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam
war." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting). In support, he noted that John Tinker had felt
"self-conscious," that a mathematics teacher "had his lesson period practically 'wrecked' chiefly by
disputes with [13 year old] Mary Beth Tinker," and that there were "comments," "warnings," and
"poking of fun" by other students. Id. at 517-18. Without even attempting to balance a school's
interest in avoiding such mild disruptions against whatever rights we may wish to accord students to
express themselves upon important issues of public concern, an even more basic inquiry may begin
with a recognition that mild diversions of this nature are a natural and common part of everyday life
in schools (and virtually anywhere else). It is difficult to imagine how one might eliminate them in a
viewpoint neutral and nondiscriminatory manner short of imposing the form of Spartan
regimentation rejected out of hand by the Court in Meyer. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-0 2.
8. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 509 n.3.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 510.
13. See id. at 504.
14. ld. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The absence of anything in the record "which impugns
the good faith" of the school administrators was the sole determinative point for Justice Harlan, who
would accord those administrators "the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order,"
and alone joined the more vehement Justice Black in dissent. Id.
15. There will always be a call to deference to school administrators in the area of their
presumptively superior general expertise, i.e., the administration of the schools under their
supervision. This should not prevent the courts from intervening at the margins, however,
particularly when basic civil liberties are implicated. As pointedly explained by Justice Jackson for
the Court in Barnette,
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body than the late Warren Court of 1969 would have had difficulty sus-
taining the actions of the administrators--or even sidestepping the is-
sue' 6-without effectively depriving students of any meaningful expres-
sive rights whatsoever (which of course was an option, though probably
not for that Court). Albeit through a rather pathetic veneer of post-hoc
justifications, the goal of the school authorities had been transparently to
keep even non-disruptive discourse on emotionally provocative contro-
versial issues completely off school property. This would have been a
difficult state of affairs to sustain as a'matter of constitutional principle.
Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court in Tinker is a powerful read,
more than making up in eloquence whatever it may have missed in terms
of consideration of the breadth of its practical implications. Noting the
amorphous fears of the school administrators, the Court reasoned:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk.., and
our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of
openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the inde-
pendence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this rela-
tively permissive, often disputatious, society.'
7
Noting that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism,"" and that "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients
Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of official authority depend
upon our possession of marked competence in the field where the invasion of rights
occurs.... [W]e act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of
our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the
function of this Court when liberty is infringed.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943). Prior to Tinker, and in matters
principally involving teachers', rather than students', rights, the Warren Court had demonstrated a
willingness to go there. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (opinion for the Court by
Justice Fortas striking down a prohibition on the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution on
free exercise and establishment clause grounds); see also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (striking down an anti-sedition law applicable to teachers on First Amendment and due
process grounds); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (striking down as a violation of
associational rights a requirement that teachers disclose all organizations to whom they have
contributed within the preceding five years).
16. Tinker may be seen as nudging into the zone where even an exercise of Professor
Alexander Bickel's celebrated "passive virtues" of avoiding controversial or premature judicial
pronouncements-i.e. by denying certiorari-would have had troublesome implications by virtue of
the message it would have sent. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-43 (1962).
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
18. Id. at 511.
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of only that which the State chooses to communicate,"' 9 the Court set the
standard that a student may express his or her opinion, even on contro-
versial subjects, essentially anywhere "on the campus during the author-
ized hours,"2° "if he does so without 'materially and substantially inter-
fer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others."
2'
Essentially, the rhetoric of Tinker was a manifestation of respect for
and confidence in our nation's young people. The Supreme Court case
was a ringing refusal to demean them as second-class citizens, or worse.
Scholars have compared Tinker, perhaps not altogether fairly, with the
propensity of Justice Scalia to refer interchangeably to "students," "chil-
dren," "children in school," and "schoolchildren" as explicitly distin-
guished from "free adults" in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.
The same comparison could as readily be made with Justice White's
opinion for the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O .23 To some degree, the
framing of the issue-i.e., are we dealing with "children" or "students"-
predetermines the outcome. However, even in the midst of the Court's
significant retrenchment from the analytical standard promulgated in
Tinker, the rhetoric of Tinker is still almost uniformly accorded defer-
ence.
24
The Court, however, has indeed retrenched as a matter practical
adjudication. Tinker was followed by uncertainty on the part of school
officials, litigiousness on the part of and on behalf of students, and some
measure of fear that Justice Black may have been right in his prognosti-
cations of students "running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins,
and smash-ins."2 5 While this fear was hardly realized, the conservatively-
shifting Court has taken the opportunity to seize upon factual scenarios
less compelling than that of John and Mary Beth Tinker as vehicles for
restoring a degree of judicial deference to administrative discretion in the
area of First Amendment rights as readily as it has done so in the context
19. Id.
20. Id. at 512-13.
21. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
22. 515 U.S. 646, 654-56 (1995) (holding that urinalysis drug testing of school athletes did
not violate the Fourth Amendment). See also Nadine Strossen, Essay: Student Rights and How They
Are Wronged, 32 U. RICH L. REV. 457, 472 (1998). Strossen, who is both a law professor and
national president of the American Civil Liberties Union, makes the point that "if other people do
not respect the rights of young people, then young people are less likely to grow up respecting the
rights of other people." Id. at 458.
23. 469 U.S. 325, 327-33 (1985) (applying a "reasonableness" rather than "probable cause"
standard to on-campus student searches).
24. See, e.g., Justice Scalia in Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995).
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Stanley Ingber, Symposium:
Twenty-Five Years After Tinker: Balancing Students' Rights: Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of
the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421, 425-26 (1995).
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of the Fourth Amendment. 26 While these shifts have commenced uni-
formly with homage to Tinker, they have nevertheless narrowed the
broad sweep of Tinker's rhetoric.
Three opinions define the critical stages of the Court's shift. The
first, Board of Education v. Pico,27 involved a student challenge to a
school board's removal of certain books from high school and junior high
school libraries which it characterized as "anti-American, anti-Christian,
anti-[Semitic], and just plain filthy., 28 A fractured and uneasy plurality of
the Court held that the board's actions had violated the First Amendment
rights of the students, and that courts may intervene and override admin-
istrative decisions when such basic constitutional values are implicated.29
Despite Justice Blackmun's lament that the "particularly complex prob-
lem" was being taken up by the Court at all,3" and Justice White's refusal
to address the constitutional issue pending a trial on remand,3 the Court
explicitly restricted its holding to the narrow subject of removal of books
already on the library shelves,32 as distinguished from their placement
there in the first place. Dissents ranged from pleas for deference on such
issues to democratically elected (and parent influenced) school boards
and administrators,33 to dissertations on the varying roles of government
as sovereign and as educator, 34 to accusations of "debilitating encroach-
ment upon the institutions of a free people. 35 Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion was accompanied by an appendix of colorful-and out of con-
text-quotations from the books in question (presumably to lend cre-
dence to the reasonableness of the school board's decisions). 36 The Pico
opinions, for all their volume and discord, are uniformly unhelpful and
for the most part manifestly unprincipled. Disparate positions are taken
vis a vie deference to school administrators with minimal, and in some
cases no, attention to their boundaries. There is no cohesive theme about
much of anything. What is evident is a shifting and floundering Court,
one less comfortable with Tinker's broad license to override the judg-
26. See generally, Acton, 515 U.S. at 654-66 (upholding scheme of suspicionless drug testing
of student-athletes under special needs doctrine); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 337-45 (permitting warrantless
search of student's purse grounded in reasonable suspicion of presence of cigarettes).
27. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
28. Pico, 457 U.S. at 857. The books included Slaughter House Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.;
The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best Stories of
Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes... ; Soul on Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver, and others. Id. at
857 n.3. The removal had been sparked by a demand by a politically conservative parent's
organization. See id. at 856.
29. See id. at 866-67.
30. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 871-72.
33. See id. at 885-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 897-903.
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ments of school administrators yet unprepared to address the frontiers of
their discretion.
The second case,* Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 7 indi-
cates a second stage in the Court's shift. In Fraser, the Court took the
opportunity to review a two-day suspension of a high school student
who, over the direct advice of his teachers, had given a sexually sugges-
tive nominating speech at a school assembly (with no apparent repercus-
sions other than some mild embarrassment and bewilderment among the
listeners).38 One may suggest that there was no particular reason to take
this case on certiorari at all, except possibly to repair some of the mess
left in the wake of Pico. What resulted was a lecture on behalf of seven
of the justices by Chief Justice Burger on society's "interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.' 39 Only Justices
Marshall and Stevens dissented. Justice Marshall argued the record did
not demonstrate that the speech had been disruptive,4" and Justice Stev-
ens objected on essentially procedural due process grounds.4' Even Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun joined the majority.42 Most tellingly, there
was no objection from any quarter to Chief Justice Burger's pronounce-
ment that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings....
'the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to
wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket.'
43
In Cohen v. California,44 Cohen's jacket bore the epithet "Fuck the
Draft" and the Court held in 1971 that he could not be punished for dis-
turbing the peace for wearing it in the corridor of the Los Angeles court-
house.45 In an opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court had declined to find
the expression "obscene" in the context it was used,' and had not found
it "inherently likely to provoke violent reaction"'' or directed to a par-
ticular person within the parameters of the "fighting words" doctrine of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.48 The Court found that Cohen's prosecu-
tion reflected at best an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance [which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expres-
sion."'" The Cohen Court noted particularly that communication encom-
37. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
38. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-79.
39. Fraser, 478 at 681.
40. See id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 691-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 687-90.
43. Id. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)).
44. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
45. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15, 26 (1971).
46. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
47. Id.
48. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
49. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
[Vol. 77:4
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passed an "emotive function" as distinct from-and perhaps even more
important than-purely "cognitive content," and that the government
must not be permitted to "seize upon the censorship of particular words
as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views."50
The distinction between Tinker's armband and Cohen's jacket may
not be as readily apparent as Chief Justice Burger would have us believe.
It is not at all clear, for example, that the latter would be any more inva-
sive of or susceptible to collision with the rights of other students than
the former, or that one would necessarily be more or less disruptive of
the school's work. In the context of Fraser, the import of the Chief Jus-
tice's comment is that school administrators may now be entrusted to
determine what is and is not "socially appropriate behavior"5 on campus
(use of the word "fuck" apparently illustrating that which is not accept-
able). Viewed solely as a case about "lewd" speech, Fraser is not par-
ticularly troublesome. Viewed as a broader and unconstrained license to
school officials to impose subjective standards of "social appropriate-
ness" upon student speech, Fraser becomes extremely troublesome from
a civil liberties perspective for precisely the reasons noted by Justice
Harlan in Cohen-this degree of unchecked regulatory discretion is pat-
ently susceptible to use "as a convenient guise for banning the expression
of unpopular views. '5 2 This standard does not fit with the "hazardous
freedom"53 of Tinker, if indeed it can be viewed as a standard at all.
The last case in the trilogy of the practical shift away from Tinker
was Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.14 In Kuhlmeier, three stu-
dent staff members of a high school newspaper sued over their principal's
decision to delete from the final edition of the paper two pages contain-
ing, among other items, an article on students' experiences with preg-
nancy and a separate article on the impact of divorce on students at the
school.55 The evidence indicated that the principal's primary concern with
the first article was a realistic prospect that the identities of the pregnant
students might be discernable, against their wishes, from the text of the
article notwithstanding their use of false names, as well as a belief that
the article's references to sexual activity and birth control might be inap-
propriate for dissemination to some of the younger students at the
school.5 6 The principal's concern with the second article was that it con-
tained negative references to the divorced parents of an interviewed stu-
dent who was identified in the article by name, while the parents had
been given neither an opportunity to respond nor to object to the article's
50. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
52. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
53. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
54. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
55. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 263.
56. See id.
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contents or its publication.57 The newspaper itself was an "integral part of
the school's" second level journalism curriculum.58
It is worth noting up front that it is much harder to fault the deci-
sions made by the Hazelwood principal than those of the administrators
in Des Moines. In fact, it may be suggested that his decisions appear
manifestly reasonable and sensitive to the concerns of students, parents,
and the most basic practices of responsible journalism. Yet, he interfered
with student expression, and he was sued. Furthermore, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals sustained the suit on the grounds that (1) the news-
paper was a "public forum" virtually immune from official censorship
except (2) when "necessary to avoid material and substantial interference
with school work or discipline ... or the rights of others."5 9 As much as
we may view the facts of Tinker as having cried out for judicial inter-
vention to a receptive Warren Court, it is hardly surprising that the facts
of Kuhlmeier fell on receptive ears at what had now become the
Rehnquist Court.
Even so, the Court did not purport to abandon Tinker. Justice
White's opinion for the Court commences with a traditional and explicit
acknowledgment of Tinker.60 Accompanied by a perfunctory nod to
Fraser's holding that the First Amendment rights of students "'are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults, '' 61 the Court pro-
ceeds to reject the proposition that curricular school newspapers qualify
as a public forum. 62 The Court finally reaches its primary point-a
proposition that there is an operative distinction between speech which a
school must tolerate and speech which a school must sponsor:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to toler-
ate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in
Tinker-is different from the question of whether the First Amend-
ment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a
student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other ex-
pressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
57. See id.
58. Id. at 264. The evidence also suggested that the principle would have taken less drastic
action than simply eliminating the articles had there been time to make changes before the scheduled
press run.
59. Id. at 265 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969)).
60. See Kuhlneier, 484 U.S. at 266.
61. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
62. See Kuhlmeier, 484 at 267-70. This holding generated a national backlash from school
journalism activists and the adoption in more than a few states of statutes affirmatively declaring




might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.
These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school cur-
riculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting,
so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to




Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not errone-
ously attributed to the school. 64
The Court concludes by defining the standard of judicial review to apply
to this newly defined "second form" of student expression: "[W]e hold
that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control of the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 65 Lest even this appear too inviting to
potential student plaintiffs, the Court continues, "[i]t is only when the
decision to censor . . . has no valid educational purpose that the First
Amendment is so 'directly and sharply implicate[d]' . . . as to require
judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights.
66
Notwithstanding the Court's facial suggestion to the contrary, it may
appear from the discussion above that Tinker has been all but lost in the
wake of Fraser and Kuhimeier, with a broadly applicable "material and
substantial interference, 67 standard being replaced by virtually complete
deference to school authorities to (1) censor whatever they want in the
context of "school-sponsored"68 activities (i.e., almost anything remotely
related to the school) as long as they are able to state some superficial
"valid educational purpose '69 for doing so, and (2) impose open-ended
standards of "socially appropriate behavior"7 ° on whatever is left. Inter-
estingly, this has not proven to be the case.
The original Tinker standard has had a persistent tendency to get its
nose above water when "school-sponsored" speech is not clearly impli-
cated, e.g., when a student was penalized by removal from a school foot-
ball team for telling his parents about a hazing incident to which he had
63. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-7 1.
64. ld. at 271.
65. Id. at 273.
66. Id. at 273 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
67. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
68. Kulhmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
69. Id. at 273.
70. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
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been subjected;" when a dress code prohibited clothing that "harasses,
threatens, intimidates, or demeans" others without creating a "substantial
risk of a material and substantial disruption";7 2 when a school sought to
prohibit t-shirts purportedly alluding to an alcoholic beverage.73 In
Mclntire, the school had asserted, as might have been predicted in the
wake of Kuhlmeier, that "at least during school hours when classes are in
session ...the district can limit student expression in any reasonable
way ... . ",0 The court did not buy it.
75
On the other hand, courts have followed Kuhlmeier when "school-
sponsored" activities have been implicated, such as when a student
sought to hand out condoms in the context of a school election,76 or when
students objected to a school's refusal to allow them to play a particular
song as part of their marching band's fall program.77 The author of this
essay met with the same result two years running in the context of
graduation ceremonies---one year representing African-American stu-
dents who wished to wear Kente Cloths over their gowns, and the second
year representing a student who wished to wear a pin expressing sympa-
thy with the victims of the Columbine High School tragedy. 78 The objec-
tions of the school administrators in each of the latter cases focused not
on the content of the particular expression at issue, but upon the prospect
that if they opened the door to one form of expression, they would fall
into the trap of unsupportable viewpoint discrimination unless they
opened the door to everything imaginable-even, and perhaps especially,
under the highly deferential Kuhlmeier standard. In other words, with the
unquestioned power to exclude came the practical imperative to exclude
everything not manifestly linked to "pedagogical concerns." This was a
rather sad and perverse commentary, particularly in the context of the
very ceremony which celebrates the students' transition to the purport-
edly greater freedoms of adulthood.
71. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 1996).
72. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Mass. 1994).
73. See Mclntire v. Bethel Sch., 804 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (W.D. Okla. 1992). This is
notwithstanding the fact that Tinker itself expressly disclaimed application to "regulation of the
length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style or deportment." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969).
74. Mclntire, 804 F.Supp. at 1418.
75. See id. at 1427.
76. See Henerey v. City of St. Charles, 200 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the School District had the right to disqualify Henerey from the election because his conduct dealt
with the controversial topic of teenage sex and because his conduct "carried with it the implied
imprimatur of the school").
77. See McCann v. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 50 F.Supp.2d 918 (E.D. Mo. 1999). The song
was Grace Slick's "White Rabbit," and the school's objection was that it promoted the illegal use of
drugs. McCann, 50 F. Supp. 2d. at 920.
78. See Ocansey v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-I, No. 98-M-1099 (D. Colo. 1998); Byrd v.
Williams, No. 99-WM-972 (D. Colo. 1999). Interestingly, in both cases the school district confined
its Kuhlmeier argument to the graduation ceremony itself, expressing no objections to the expressive
symbols at issue under the Tinker standard either before or after the formal ceremony.
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In the end, it is Fraser that seems to have been at least temporar-
ily-and one may frankly hope permanently-lost in the adjudicatory
shuffle. This alone may be quite a positive thing, as Fraser certainly em-
bodies the judicial approach potentially most dangerous from a civil lib-
erties perspective and most demeaning to students and contemptuous of
young people in general. What is left appears to be an uneasy dichotomy
between Tinker and Kuhimeier, turning upon whether or not the context
within which the speech occurs may be viewed as "school-sponsored."
The issue is one of the degree of deference to be accorded presumptively
to administrative discretion. It is within this dichotomy that we find our-
selves in the wake of the April 20, 1999 shootings at Columbine High
School.
The primary legitimate concern raised by Columbine is, of course,
the physical safety of both students and teachers. In this regard, we may
expect a focused discourse particularly on Fourth Amendment issues in
the continued aftermath of the shootings. The justification for constrict-
ing First Amendment rights, while much in the news, 79 is far less appar-
ent from a principled perspective. Yet, this is where many of the emo-
tional aftershocks are being felt.
It is essential to recall that the "hazardous freedom" 80 validated in
Tinker in no way limits the ability of school officials to ensure safety.
The standard enunciated by the Court in Tinker expressly excludes from
its protection "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materi-
ally disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others . "..."81 This exclusion is broad enough to address
virtually all realistic and legitimate threats to safety. Kuhlmeier adds
nothing particular to the mix on this point'- it is difficult to imagine a
scenario in which speech or conduct which could realistically and legiti-
mately pose a danger to others would be protected under Tinker and
79. By way of illustration: A Virginia high school student was suspended in the immediate
wake of Columbine for dyeing his hair blue-a suspension justified by the school board chairman on
the grounds that "[tihere are things we have to look at now, with the mood of the whole nation," and
supported by the governor's attribution of the Columbine shootings to an "anything goes attitude
toward students' appearance[s]." Wes Allison, ACLU Threatens Surry Law Suit; On Behalf of Blue-
Haired Youth; Student Expelled After Columbine Slayings, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 26,
1999, at A-I. A Minnesota high school senior's picture was removed from the school year book
because it showed her seated on a flag-draped VFW howitzer as an expression of her patriotism and
anticipated career in the United States Army. Doug Grow, When Zero Tolerance Hits at Common
Sense: Even a Patriotic Student's Senior Picture Isn't Exempt from School's Weapons Rule,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1999, at B2. All-black clothing, trench coats, oversized
baggy pants, camouflaged attire, spiked jewelry, swastikas, bandannas, skull caps, and pentagrams
were banned under a revised school dress code in Texas, and a 17-year old student was suspended
for wearing a black armband to honor the Columbine victims and as a statement of protest against
new school rules restricting student speech. Sandy Louey, Dress Code Changes in Works; Allen,
McKinney React to Incidents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 24, 1999, at JI.
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
81. Id. at 513.
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could be prevented only due to its nexus with some "school-sponsored"
activity.
Tinker requires something more, however. It requires that a restric-
tion upon expression be validated by something beyond an enunciation
of "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. '82 This is a
critical caveat. Absent this caveat, mere invocation of the word "Colum-
bine" would be sufficient to impose "absolute regimentation,"83 and
squelch any vestige of independent expression and, for that matter,
thought. Absent this caveat, school officials and administrators would be
accorded virtually absolute discretion to impose upon our students their
subjective standards of whatever may be viewed as "socially appropriate"
by themselves, or their momentarily most vocal constituency-i.e.,
Fraser becoming virulently malignant. This caveat is a last line of de-
fense against both administrative and majoritarian abuses, and against
even a good faith loss of perspective (if not common sense) that may
accompany times of passion. It is the line upon which our courts-"by
force of [their] commissions" to quote Justice Jackson u-must stand.
The examples recited in footnote 79, supra, are sadly illustrative
(though hardly exhaustive) of the levels to which we are all quite unwit-
tingly capable of sinking absent some imperative that we pause for a
moment and consider the implications of the power we are abusing.
Tinker's caveat regarding "undifferentiated fear or apprehension" '85 assists
with that pause. This is one of the great benefits of mandating a constant,
if not always overriding, level of constitutional discourse in the face of
administrative discretion. If nothing else, it keeps us honest. The great
threat of convulsions like Columbine is that they make it seductively
easy to be innocently dishonest. We become at least temporarily more
tolerant of those who, frequently with the best of intentions, would im-
pose (rather than truthfully seek to teach and inculcate) a viewpoint or
lifestyle and stifle a competing one. The Columbine tragedy does not call
for prohibiting blue hair or gothic dress styles any more than letter jack-
ets or cardigan sweaters. It does not justify depriving students of the op-
portunity to think for themselves and engage in emotive and intellectual
expression merely because it does not resonate with our own sensitivi-
ties. It does not justify the exclusion of controversial subjects from the
halls of our schools. Columbine is not a license to demean our young
people as incapable or unworthy of being respected or trusted.
In the aftermath of Columbine, the legacy of Tinker is perhaps more
crucial than it has ever been. There is room in that legacy for the opera-
tive limitations and inculcative function defined in Kuhlmeier. There is
82. Id. at 508.
83. Id.
84. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
85. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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more than adequate accommodation for the safety of our students and
teachers. There is a strong basis for broad deference to the wisdom and
policies of the elective boards and administrative personnel who operate
our public school systems. There is also, however, a philosophical and
practical commitment to the "hazardous freedom... that is the basis of
our national strength."86 If we want that strength to last, this commitment
belongs as much in our schools as it does anywhere in our society.
86. Id. at 508-09.
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